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Spurred at least in part by the revenue crunch precipitated by the
financial crisis, the United States has taken an aggressive stance
towards non-reporting of offshore income and attendant offshore tax
evasion. Our contribution discusses administrative and legal
mechanisms, especially the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act
(FATCA), that the United States has deployed to obtain offshore tax
information. As this National Report reveals, while FATCA has been
widely criticized as unilateral and extraterritorial legislation, it also
has bolstered the offshore tax compliance efforts of governments
other than the United States. For many jurisdictions, FATCA thus
offers an aspirational new global standard for automatic exchange of
information – one that would supplement, if not replace, information
exchange on request.
I. THE RISE OF FATCA
Every year, the United States loses at least $100 billion in tax
revenue as a result of tax evasion that occurs through the use of
offshore bank accounts.1 Offshore evasion strategies have ranged
from diversion of earnings from U.S. sources into offshore trusts and
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other entities2 to the conversion of cash holdings by individuals into
diamonds, which were then smuggled out of the United States
concealed in a tube of toothpaste before being secreted in Swiss bank
vaults.3 Historically, these evasion strategies have been effective due
to other jurisdictions’ strong bank secrecy rules.4 To overcome lack
of cooperation from other jurisdictions, the United States has
undertaken a series of aggressive tax enforcement approaches,
culminating in the adoption of the FATCA in 2010.5
Background. Starting in 2001, foreign financial institutions
(FFIs) could enter into “Qualified Intermediary” (QI) agreements
with the United States.6 Foreign financial institutions that became
QIs agreed to determine the identity of their clients, but they did not
have to report the identities of non-U.S. clients, including
corporations, to the IRS as long as QIs concluded that the proper
amount of U.S. tax was withheld on U.S.-source payments to the
non-U.S. clients.7
The highly publicized whistleblower case of Bradley Birkenfeld,
a former UBS banker,8 and the IRS’s related John Doe summonses9
revealed that UBS encouraged U.S. taxpayers to form foreign shell
corporations which would then open offshore accounts at UBS. UBS
then took the position that no withholding was required with respect
to the payments to the foreign shells, even though its bankers knew

2

For discussion, see PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, COMM. ON
HOMELAND SEC. AND GOV’T AFFAIRS, 108TH CONG., TAX HAVEN ABUSES: THE
ENABLERS, THE TOOLS AND SECRECY 1 (2006).
3
See Mark Hosenball & Evan Thomas, Cracking the Vault, NEWSWEEK, Mar.
23, 2009, at 32.
4
See, e.g., Bradley J. Bondi, Don’t Tread on Me: Has the United States
Government’s Quest for Customer Records from UBS Sounded the Death Knell for
Swiss Bank Secrecy Laws?, 30 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 1 (2010) (describing Swiss
bank secrecy rules).
5
See Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment Act, Pub. L. No. 111-147, §
501, 124 Stat. 71 (2010).
6
See Treas. Reg. § 1.1441-1.
7
Id.
8
See Year in Review: The 2009 Person of the Year, TAX NOTES TODAY, Jan. 4,
2010, at 1-3 (describing Birkenfeld’s actions).
9
STAFF OF PERMANENT S. COMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, COMM. ON HOMELAND
SEC’Y AND GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS, 110TH CONG., STAFF REP., TAX HAVEN BANKS
AND U.S. TAX COMPLIANCE 3 (2008).
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that the beneficial owners were U.S. residents.10 Under a deferred
prosecution agreement with the United States, UBS agreed to pay a
fine of $780 million, release (through the Swiss government) the
names of 250 U.S. holders of offshore UBS accounts, and cease its
illegal banking and brokerage activities in the United States. Under a
separate agreement, UBS ultimately agreed to disclose the names of
4,500 of an estimated 20,000 U.S. holders of offshore accounts at
UBS.
There is little reason to think that abuses of the QI regime were
limited to UBS. The magnitude of offshore evasion became even
more apparent when, contemporaneously with its actions against
UBS and other financial institutions, the government announced in
2009 an offshore voluntary compliance initiative, under which nearly
15,000 U.S. taxpayers disclosed to the IRS that they held funds in
previously unreported offshore accounts.11
FATCA. In response to the weaknesses of the QI regime, and the
increased attention on the offshore evasion epidemic following the
UBS deferred prosecution agreement, Congress enacted FATCA in
2010.12 Under FATCA, participating FFIs are required to report the
name, address, and other identifying information for each account
holder that is a U.S. person, the account number and balance, and any
gross dividends, interest, and other income paid to the account. In
addition, participating FFIs must obtain various documents from any
account holders that possess indicia of U.S. status, such as a power of
attorney granted to someone with a U.S. address. Participating FFIs
also are required to withhold 30% on certain payments to recalcitrant
account holders and other financial institutions that do not comply
with FATCA.
FATCA’s enforcement mechanism is both potent and innovative.
FFIs refusing to cooperate with the regime by reporting the required
information are subject to a 30% withholding tax on certain U.S.source payments, including U.S.-source interest and dividends, gross
proceeds from the sale of assets that generate U.S. dividends and
10

See, e.g., UBS Deferred Prosecution Agreement, at 2. See also id., Exhibit
C, at 4-5.
11
See Shulman Addresses IRS’s Strategic Priorities for the Future, TAX NOTES
TODAY, May 19, 2011, at 97-11.
12
See Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment Act, Pub. L. No. 111-147, §
501, 124 Stat. 71 (2010).
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interest.13 To avoid being subject to this withholding tax, FFIs must
register with the IRS and commit to report information regarding
their U.S. account holders and non-U.S. account holders that are
entities with substantial U.S. owners.14
Criticism.
Commentators have characterized FATCA as
15
“aggressive,”
“audacious,”16 “egregious,”17 “draconian”18 and
“devastatingly destructive.”19 The principal criticisms have been that
FATCA is not only unilateral,20 but also extraterritorial.21 Critics
contend that FATCA requires financial institutions in jurisdictions
outside the U.S. to act like “U.S. Treasury watchdogs”22 and that it
“strong arms every financial institution in the world into doing the
13

See I.R.C. §§ 1471(a), 1473(1).
See I.R.C. § 1471(c).
15
Scott D. Michel, FATCA: A new era of financial transparency, J. OF ACC.,
Jan. 2013.
16
Susan C. Morse, Ask for Help, Uncle Sam: The Future of Global Tax
Reporting, 57 VILL. L. REV. 529, 536 (2012).
17
Don Whiteley, IRS Wants Canada to Nab U.S. Tax Cheats: Why We Should
Care,
The
Globe
and
Mail,
Jan.
7,
2013,
available
at
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-debate/irs-wants-canada-to-nab-us-taxcheats-why-we-should-care/article6994760/#dashboard/follows/.
18
Id.
19
Andrew F. Quinlan, FATCA and US fiscal imperialism threaten to sink
global economy, THE DAILY CALLER, Mar. 19, 2013, available at
http://dailycaller.com/2013/03/19/fatca-and-us-fiscal-imperialism-threaten-to-sinkglobal-economy/.
20
See, e.g., EU Parliament FATCA Hearing, May 28, 2013 (statement of
Marie Rosvall, President of the Fiscal Committee, European Banking Federation)
available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zRoU-JNFhr0, at 22:44. (“How can
one country impose its law on other countries without any consultations or
discussions?”).
21
Canadian Finance Minister Jim Flahertty described FATCA’s “far-reaching
extraterritorial implications” that would “turn Canadian banks into extensions of
the IRS.” Letter from Finance Minister Jim Flaherty to The Washington Post, the
New York Times, and the Wall Street Journal (Sept. 16, 2011) available at
http://business.financialpost.com/2011/09/16/read-jim-flahertys-letter-onamericans-in-canada. See also Arthur J. Cockfield, The Limits of the International
Tax Regime as a Commitment Provider, 33 Va. Tax Rev. 59 (2013), at 102-3, (“the
unilateral nature of FATCA arguably subverts traditional multilateral processes”).
See also Allison Christians, Putting the Reign Back in Sovereign, 40 PEPP. L. REV.
1373, 1408 (“[FATCA] proposes a turn away from multilateralism”).
22
Christopher Elias, U.S. Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act Threatens
Investment in the U.S., Thomson Reuters, Jan. 25, 2012.
14
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job of the IRS.”23 According to representatives of large financial
institutions and other businesses outside the United States, the
legislation will result in billions of dollars in implementation costs.24
In addition, some government officials outside of the United States
assert that despite the attempt by the United States enter into
intergovernmental agreements (IGAs), FATCA conflicts with the
local banking and privacy laws of many other jurisdictions.25
Further, critics contend that the United States acts like the “loan
sheriff in town”26 by demanding information from other jurisdictions
without offering any information in exchange. In light of this
criticism and the legal obstacles of local bank secrecy rules, several
commentators have even predicted that the FATCA regime will not
survive.27
III. FROM UNILATERLISM TO MULTILATERALISM
While complaints about the unilateralism and extraterritoriality of
FATCA certainly are not without merit, FATCA also has enhanced
multilateral cooperation in combating tax evasion, and it has spawned
similar legislation and treaties in other jurisdictions. This Part
reviews these developments.
Model Intergovernmental Agreements.
The largest EU
countries—France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the United
Kingdom—as well as the EU’s Commission worked with the United
States to develop the text of the Model 1 IGA. Along with the Model
2 agreement, these IGAs seek to both reduce compliance burdens for
FFIs and avoid conflicts between FFIs’ obligations under FATCA
and their client-confidentiality obligations under foreign law. For
example, FFIs located in Model 1 partner jurisdictions need not enter
23

Quinlan, supra note 19.
See Kate Burgess, US legislation: Industry concerned at extraterritorial tax
clampdown plan, FINANCIAL TIMES, May 8, 2012.
25
Patricia Lee, U.S. extra-territorial approach to regulations could have
unintended consequences for Asia-Pacific region, Thomson Reuters, Sept. 4, 2012.
26
Jeff N. Mukadi, FATCA and the Shaping of a New International Tax Order,
TAX NOTES, June 25, 2012.
27
See e.g., Peter Spiro, The (Dwindling) Rights and Obligations of Citizenship,
21 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 899 (2013) (“It is not clear that the FATCA regime is
sustainable”); Frederic Behrens, Using a Sledgehammer to Crack a Nut: Why
FATCA Will Not Stand, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 205.
24
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into separate FFI agreements with the United States in order to avoid
the withholding tax.28
Importantly, the Model 1 IGA developed with the G5 and the EU
Commission contemplates reciprocal automatic exchange of
information from U.S. financial institutions. The United States
entered into the first Model 1 IGA with the United Kingdom, and
several more have followed. The United States is actively engaged in
talks with 70 jurisdictions regarding FATCA.29
Son of FATCA. Perhaps more remarkable has been the adoption
of FATCA-like legislation or treaties by other jurisdictions. For
example, the United Kingdom has drafted “son of FATCA”
legislation aimed at securing information from its crown
dependencies and overseas territories.30
In addition to this
legislation, the United Kingdom has entered into information-sharing
agreements with its crown dependencies modeled on the U.S.-U.K.
bilateral IGA.31 Notably, in order to minimize additional compliance
burdens for financial institutions, the United Kingdom has
incorporated nearly identical reporting requirements as those required
under the U.S. model IGAs, even going so far as to denominate
threshold account values in U.S. dollars and incorporating by
reference U.S. Treasury regulations.32 An important difference is that
28

Other benefits of the Model I IGA for FFIs include reduced due diligence
requirements and exemptions from FATCA reporting requirements for more kinds
of institutions and products.
29
Robert Stack, Myth vs. FATCA: The Truth About Treasury’s Effort to
Combat
Offshore
Evasion
(Sept.
20,
2013)
available
at
http://www.treasury.gov/connect/blog/Pages/Myth-vs-FATCA.aspx . Under the
Model 2 IGA, the FATCA partner country will authorize its FFIs to report
FATCA-required information directly to the IRS. The U.S. has entered into Model
2 IGAs with Bermuda, Japan, and Switzerland.
30
John McCann & Angela Nightingale, Tax Information Sharing, The Rise of
‘FATCA-esque” Agreements. Aima, p. 2, October 24, 2013 available at
www.aima.org/en/education/aimajournal/q12013/tax-information-sharing.cfm
31
Isle of Man, Guernsey, and Jersey. See, e.g., Statement of Guernsey’s Chief
Minister describing the UK-Guernsey agreement as providing for “enhanced
reporting of tax information along FATCA principles.” States of Guernsey, Press
Release (May 14, 2013) available at http://www.gov.gg/article/107574/ChiefMinister-emphasises-Guernseys-support-for-greater-global-tax-transparency.
32
See, e.g., Agreement Between the Government of the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of Jersey to Improve
International Tax Compliance, Annex I, art II (Reporting Financial Institutions
may, as an alternative to the reporting procedures provided in the agreement, apply
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the United Kingdom’s agreements with its crown dependencies lack
the withholding tax enforcement mechanism of FATCA.
In the same vein, the French “mini-FATCA” aims at overseas
trusts and carries a penalty of the larger of €10,000 or 5% of the
corpus for failure to provide detailed information on the assets of
French residents.33
FATCA as New Global Standard. In addition to the jurisdictions
emulating FATCA, many jurisdictions view FATCA as an
opportunity to establish a global standard for automatic information
exchange. For example, in discussing its new information-sharing
agreements with its crown dependencies, the UK government stated
that, “[t]he UK was quick to see the potential. . . to embed a new
international standard in the exchange of information based around
the FATCA model. This would provide a step-change in the ability
of the international community to tackle tax evasion, while
minimizing costs for governments and business (who are already
investing in the systems and processes necessary to comply with the
US FATCA legislation and the subsequent intergovernmental
agreements to implement it).” The United Kingdom announced that,
in addition to its crown dependencies, it would seek to negotiate
similar automatic information exchange agreements with other
jurisdictions, and that these contemplated agreements, along with its
own IGA with the United States “all form part of a drive to embed a
new single international standard in the automatic exchange of tax
information.” Likewise, in May 2013, sixteen EU member states
called for a “new global standard for automatic exchange of
information to tackle tax evasion, based on the U.S. FATCA
legislation.” Most importantly, in early 2014, the OECD
announced,34 and the G20 approved,35 a new Common Reporting and

the reporting procedures described in the “U.S. Treasury Regulations”). See id., at
art. 1.1(f), defining “U.S. Regulations” as those “Relating to Information Reporting
by Foreign Financial Institutions and Withholding on Certain Payments to Foreign
Financial Institutions and Other Foreign Entities.” See also id. (incorporating
amendments to the U.S. regulations, to the extent agreed by the parties).
33
McCann & Nightingale, supra, p 2
34
OECD, Standard for Automatic Exchange of Financial Account Information:
Common Reporting Standard (undated document declassified Jan 17, 2014) at 6
available at http://www.oecd.org/ctp/exchange-of-tax-information/AutomaticExchange-Financial-Account-Information-Common-Reporting-Standard.pdf.
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Due Diligence Standard for use by countries wishing to exchange
information automatically.
The OECD describes this standard as

“draw[ing] extensively on the intergovernmental approach to
implementing FATCA” “with a view maximizing efficiency and
reducing cost for financial institutions.”36
Multilateral Information Exchange. FATCA also seems to have
precipitated or accelerated efforts at multilateral information
exchange. For example, the G5 announced that they will exchange
information multilaterally based on the U.S. IGA Model
Agreement.37 Likewise, official statements from the EU cast FATCA
as providing “a unique opportunity to move from a series of bilateral
agreements to a multilateral system.”38 Indeed, unilateral FATCA
ultimately may help improve the leaky EU Savings Directive.39
Veto-holding EU Member States attempting to preserve what was left
of banking secrecy in their jurisdictions have blocked amendments to
the Directive.40 Members of the EU Parliament, even when they
vehemently oppose FATCA, seem to agree that FATCA has
galvanized the EU into action.
For example, at a public
35

See Commissioner Šemeta welcomes G20 Finance Ministers' agreement on
global tax transparency standard, Tax Analysts Worldwide Tax Daily, (Feb. 23,
2014), Doc 2014-4106 , 2014 WTD 37-13.
36
OECD, Standard for Automatic Exchange, supra note 34, at 3 (describing
the aim of the standard as “to avoid a proliferation of different standards which
would increase costs for both governments and financial institutions”).
37
HM Treasury, Joint Communique on the ‘Model Intergovernmental
Agreement to Improve Tax Compliance and Implement FATCA’ (Jul. 26, 2012)
available
at
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/joint-communique-on-themodel-intergovernmental-agreement-to-improve-tax-compliance-and-implementfatca.
38
Statement by Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia,
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom on the Pilot Multilateral
Automatic information Exchange Facility, ECOFIN 14 May 2013 available at
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/statement-on-the-pilot-multilateralautomatic-information-exchange-facility. See also Council of the EU, Press
Release, 3238th Council Meeting, Economic and Financial Affairs, 14 May 2013 at
12,
available
at
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ecofin/137122
.pdf.
39
Council Directive 2003/48, 2003 O.J. (L 157) 38 on taxation of savings.
40
For the requirement of member state unanimity in tax matters, see Treaty on
the Functioning of the European Union, art. 115.
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parliamentary hearing on FATCA, MEP Sophia in ‘t Veld
(Netherlands) stated, “The fact that we’re welcoming the application
of third country law on our territory is only a reflection of the
weakness of the European Union. We only have ourselves to blame
because we were unable to adopt our own policies.”41
If FATCA represents a new global standard for information
exchange, that standardization would mitigate the concern by
banking associations that they are being asked to shoulder an
extraordinary administrative burden only with respect to Americans.
If every country adopted a FATCA-like regime, FFIs would no
longer be looking for American needles in a global haystack.
Standardization according to the FATCA model also would mitigate
FFIs’ concerns that they could be subject to a variety of conflicting
reporting requirements imposed by different states. Likewise, IGAs
and attendant legislative changes in FATCA partner countries resolve
conflicts between FFIs’ obligations under FATCA and their
obligations under local law. In short, multilateralism and cooperation
may be the key to successful implementation of what has been
criticized as unilateral and extraterritorial U.S. legislation.
IV. UNANSWERED QUESTIONS
Even as IGAs solve conflicts between FATCA and foreign law,
IGAs themselves raise domestic legal questions. For example,
Congressman Bill Posey (R.-Fla) recently sent a letter to U.S.
Treasury Secretary Jack Lew questioning the legal authority under
which the IGAs are negotiated and asking whether Treasury expects
IGAs to be self-executing.42
IGAs also raise political questions. For example, to the extent
that the United States negotiates reciprocal Model 1 IGAs,43
implementing legislation presumably would be required to impose

41

See EU parliamentary hearing on FATCA at 38:57 available at
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zRoU-JNFhr0 .
42
Letter from Congressman Bill Posey letter to Treasury Secr. Jack Lew (Jul.
1, 2013).
43
Model Intergovernmental Agreement to Improve Tax Compliance and to
Implement FATCA, art. 6, at 13-14 (describing U.S. commitments to exchange
information on a reciprocal basis with the FATCA partner).
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new reporting requirements on U.S. financial institutions,44 and such
new reporting requirements likely would face political resistance
from affected parties. If domestic financial institutions do not already
possess account ownership information sufficient to determine their
reporting obligations under reciprocal IGAs, their compliance
burdens will increase (and, presumably, so will their political
resistance to reciprocity).45 To take just one example, if domestic
financial institutions ultimately will be obliged to apply FATCA’s
pass-through rules for payments to entities, domestic financial
institutions will face the problem of accounts held by Delaware LLCs
for which they lack beneficial ownership information.46
These are really just the tip of the iceberg; FATCA raises many
additional questions. For example, can the U.S. standard become a
worldwide standard, in light of competing pre-existing automatic
information exchange obligations, such as the EU Savings
Directive?47 Are the privacy protections afforded to account holders
44

See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES:
BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2014, at 202
(proposing to request such legislation)
45
Under current IGAs, the reciprocal reporting obligations of the United States
are limited to information that U.S. financial institutions already are required to
collect concerning non-U.S. account holders. See Model Intergovernmental
Agreement to Improve Tax Compliance and to Implement FATCA, available at
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Documents/reciprocal.pdf, art
2(2)(b), at 9. But the Model 1 IGA also includes a statement that the United States
will pursue “equivalent levels of information exchange.” See id., at 1.
Additionally, under the heading “Reduce the Tax Gap and Make Reforms” the
Analytical Perspectives for the 2014 budget briefly describes a budget proposal that
would provide the Secretary of the Treasury authority to “prescribe regulations that
would require reporting of information with respect to nonresident alien
individuals, entities that are not U.S. persons, and certain U.S. entities held in
substantial part by non-U.S. owners, including information regarding account
balances and payments made with respect to accounts held by such persons and
entities.” OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES: BUDGET OF
THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2014, at 202. The proposal notes that
reciprocal exchange of information “similar” to that required from FFIs under
FATCA would improve intergovernmental cooperation on FATCA enforcement.
Id.
46
See OECD Peer Review of the United States at 38, 87 (citing complaints by
U.S. information exchange partner states that beneficial ownership information is
not available for LLCs in several states, including Delaware).
47
See, e.g., EU Commission, An Action Plan to Strengthen the Fight Against
Tax Fraud and Tax Evasion, COM(2012) 772 final (Dec. 6, 2012) at 9 (“this
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adequate under FATCA? To what extent will developing countries
benefit from a new standard of automatic information exchange,
particularly when those countries lack the administrative apparatus to
reciprocate information?48
FATCA already represents a substantial commitment of
government resources, both by FATCA partner jurisdictions and by
the United States, which so far has developed and negotiated nineteen
IGAs and written hundreds of pages of guidance.49 Affected financial
institutions also have shouldered heavy burdens to implement a
reporting regime that is estimated to raise only $8.7 billion over ten
years.50 Moreover, the complexity and novel legal questions raised by
FATCA, which have necessitated extended effective dates and the
phasing-in of its provisions over a period of six years, raise questions
about the ultimate fate of the legislation. If political will for FATCA
was founded principally on fiscal stress, will the United States
abandon the regime as the economy improves?
V. CONCLUSION
Fiscal crisis emboldened the United States to use access to its
capital markets as an enforcement mechanism for securing
information about domestic taxpayers from foreign institutions. And,
in turn, the U.S. passage of FATCA emboldened some our trading
partners to rally behind a new standard of automatic information
exchange. Thus, the initial outraged reactions to FATCA among
private parties and government officials seems to be shifting to
acquiescence by the FFIs, and at least some government officials
view FATCA as an opportunity to strengthen their own offshore
enforcement.

document urges the OECD to adopt reporting forms and software developed for
implementing the EU Savings Directive”).
48
For discussion, see Itai Grinberg, Taxing Capital Income in Emerging
Countries: Will FATCA Open the Door?, 5 WORLD TAX J. 325-367 (2013).
49
As of January 22, 2014.
For a current list of IGAs, see
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/pages/fatcaarchive.aspx
50
See JCT, JCT Estimates Budget Effect of HIRE Act, JCX-5-10 (Feb. 23,
2010).
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APPENDIX: ADDITIONAL QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSES
Sources of the exchange of information system in United States
1. Which tax treaties between the United States and other

countries, if any, contain the following?:
a. Art. 26 of the OECD MTC
b. Art. 26, paragraph 5, of the OECD MTC
c. Art. 27 of the OECD MTC
Country

Article 26

Armenia (USSR
treaty 1973)
Australia (treaty
1982, protocol 2001)

No

Austria (treaty 1996)

Azerbaijan (USSR
treaty 1973)
Bangladesh (treaty
2006)
Barbados (treaty
1984, protocol 2004)
Belarus (USSR
treaty 1973)
Belgium (treaty
2006, protocol 2006,
memorandum 2009)
Bulgaria (treaty
2007, protocols
2007, 2008)
51

Article,
Para. 551
No

26 Article 27
No

Yes, not
exact
language
Yes, not
exact
language
No

No

No

No

Yes, not exact
language

No

No

Yes, not
exact
language
Yes, not
exact
language
No

Yes, not exact
language

No

Yes, not exact
language

No

No

No

Yes, not
exact
language
Yes, not
exact
language

Yes, not exact
language

Yes, not exact
language

Yes

No

Current (2006) U.S. Model Tax Treaty contains equivalent language in
Article 26(5). This chart indicates whether such language is included in the
relevant treaties in force.
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Canada (treaty 1980,
protocols 1980,
2007)
China (treaty 1984)

Cyprus (treaty 1984)

Czech Republic
(treaty 1993)
Denmark (treaty
2000, protocol 2006)
Egypt (treaty 1980)

Estonia (treaty 1998)

Finland (treaty 1989,
protocol 2006)
France (treaty 1994,
protocols 2004,
2009, memorandum
2009)
Georgia (USSR
treaty 1973)
Germany (treaty
1989, protocol 2006)
Greece (treaty 1950)

Hungary (treaty
1979)

UNITED STATES
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Yes, not
exact
language
Yes, not
exact
language
Yes, not
exact
language
Yes, not
exact
language
Yes, not
exact
language
Yes, not
exact
language
Yes, not
exact
language
Yes, not
exact
language
Yes, not
exact
language

Yes

Yes, not exact
language

No

No

No (but see
notes of
exchange)
No

Yes, not exact
language

Yes, not exact
language

Yes, not exact
language

No

Yes, not exact
language

Yes, not exact
language

Yes, not exact
language

Yes, not exact
language

Yes, not exact
language

Yes

Yes, not exact
language

No

No

No

Yes, not
exact
language
Yes, not
exact
language
Yes, not
exact
language

Yes, not exact
language

Yes, not exact
language

No

Yes, not exact
language

no

Yes, not exact
language

No

14

Iceland (treaty 2007,
protocol 2007)
India (treaty 1989)

Indonesia (treaty
1988)
Ireland (treaty 1997,
amendment 1999)
Israel (treaty 1975)

Italy (treaty 1999)

Jamaica (treaty
1980)
Japan (treaty 2003,
protocol 2003)
Kazakhstan (treaty
1993)
Korea, South (treaty
1976)
Kyrgyzstan (USSR
treaty 1973)
Latvia (treaty 1998)

Lithuania (treaty
1998)
Luxembourg (treaty
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1996)
Malta (treaty 2008)

Mexico (treaty 1992,
protocol 2003)
Moldova (USSR
Treaty 1973)
Morocco (treaty
1977)
Netherlands (treaty
1992, protocol 2004)
New Zealand (treaty
1982, protocol 2008)
Norway (treaty
1971)
Pakistan (treaty
1957)
Philippines (treaty
1976)
Poland (treaty 1974)

Portugal (treaty
1994)
Romania (treaty
1973)
Russia (treaty 1992)
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language
Slovak Republic
Yes, not
exact
(treaty 1993)
language
Slovenia (treaty
Yes, not
exact
1999)
language
South Africa (treaty Yes, not
exact
1997)
language
Spain (treaty 1990)
Yes, not
exact
language
Sri Lanka (treaty
Yes, not
1993, protocol
exact
2002?)
language
Sweden (treaty 1994, Yes, not
protocol 2005)
exact
language
Switzerland (treaty
Yes, not
exact
1996)
language
Tajikistan (USSR
No
treaty 1973)
Thailand (treaty
Yes, not
1996)
exact
language
Trinidad (treaty
Yes, not
1970)
exact
language
Tunisia (treaty 1985) Yes, not
exact
language
Turkey (treaty 1996) Yes, not
exact
language
Turkmenistan
No
(USSR treaty 1973)
Ukraine (treaty
Yes, not
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1994)
United Kingdom
(treaty 2001,
protocol 2001)
Uzbekistan (USSR
treaty 1973)
Venezuela (treaty
1999)

UNITED STATES

exact
language
Yes, not
exact
language
No
Yes, not
exact
language
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Yes (see
exchange notes)

Yes, not exact
language

No

No

Yes, not exact
language

No

2. Is the United States a party to the OECD Mutual Assistance

Convention of 1988 and the 2010 Protocol?
The United States is party to the OECD Mutual Assistance
Convention of 1988, which has been in force since April 1, 1995.52
While the United States signed the 2010 Protocol (May 27, 2010), it
has not been ratified nor entered into force. The United States entered
reservations with respect to Articles 2, 3, 4, 17, 29 and 30.53
3. Describe the Tax Information Exchange Agreements (TIEAs)

signed by United States with black or grey list countries.
United States Tax Information Agreements
Country
American Samoa
Antigua and Barbuda
Aruba
Bahamas
Barbados
Bermuda
Brazil
52

Date
1987
2001
2003
2002
1984
1988
2007

In Force?
1988
2003
2004
2004/2006
1984
1988
2013

See OECD, STATUS OF THE CONVENTION ON MUTUAL
ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANCE IN TAX MATTERS AND AMENDING
PROTOCOL, November 12, 2013, available at http://www.oecd.org/tax/exchangeof-tax-information/Status_of_convention.pdf
53
See id.
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British Virgin Islands
Cayman Islands
Colombia
Costa Rica
Dominica
Dominica Republic
Gibraltar
Grenada
Guam
Guernsey
Guyana
Honduras
Isle of Man
Jamaica
Jersey
Liechtenstein
Marshall Islands
Mexico
Netherlands Antilles
Peru
Puerto Rico
St. Lucia
Trinidad and Tobago

UNITED STATES

2002
2001
2001
1989
1987
1989
2009
1986
1989
2002
1992
1990
2002
1986
2002
2008
1991
1989
2002
1990
1989
1987
1989
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No
2004/2006
No
1991
1988
1989
2009/2010
1987
No
2006
1992
1991
2004/2006
1986
No
2010
1991
1990
2007
1991
1989
1991
1990

The collection and exchange of information under anti-moneylaundering legislation
The United States has implemented several different measures to
prevent tax evasion and money laundering. These are described
briefly below.
Investment Income Reporting. Banks must report to the IRS
information regarding the income that their customers earn in their
individual banking and checking accounts. Each January, banks
provide to the IRS a report, IRS Form 1099-INT, which summarizes
the interest income paid to their account holders. The interest that
must be reported includes interest paid by the bank on savings
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accounts, interest-bearing checking accounts and bonds.
Money Laundering. When individuals deposit or withdraw more
than USD 10,000 in a U.S. bank, the bank is required to file a
“Currency Transaction Report” with the IRS. Several exemptions
prevent this reporting requirement from applying to certain retail and
other customers. This reporting requirement is designed to enable
the IRS to detect money laundering and financial crimes.
Tax Evasion Reporting. A U.S. person who holds a financial
interest in a non-U.S. bank account must file a Report of Foreign
Bank and Financial Accounts (FBAR) if the aggregate value of the
foreign financial accounts exceeds USD 10,000 at any time during
the calendar year. Penalties of up to USD 10,000 may apply for nonwilfully failure to file an FBAR. Wilful non-filing, can result in
penalties as high as 50% of the value of the non-US account, and
additional criminal penalties. There is no cap on the amount of this
penalty.
Exchange of Information System in Practice: The Numbers
The Internal Revenue Service has released the number of
incoming exchange requests for the years 2006 to 2010. The table
below presents the number of incoming requests (i.e., from other
countries to the United States) and outgoing requests (i.e., from the
United States to other countries):
INCOMING AND OUTGOING SPECIFIC INFORMATION EXCHANGE
REQUESTS
2006-201054
2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

All

Incoming
(to US)

1,173

1,088

797

914

843

4,815

Outgoing
(to other
countries)

221

197

236

203

165

1,022

TOTAL

1,394

1,285

1,033

1,117

1,008

5,837

54

Gen. Acc’t. Office, IRS’s Information Exchanges with Other Countries
Could Be Improved through Better Performance Information, 21, Sept. 2011.
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Taxing authorities, whether the IRS or a non-U.S. agency,
respond to information requests with varying processing speeds,
depending on the type of information requested. The table below
describes the processing time for different categories of information
requests during the years 2006 to 2009.
PROCESSING TIME FOR INFORMATION REQUESTS,
CATEGORY, 2006-2009 55

Type of Information
Request
Bank records
Corporate records
Public records
Real estate records
Records from security
brokers
Tax return data
Third-party interviews
Other
All cases where
information type is
known

BY INFORMATION

Incoming Requests
(to U.S.)
% of
Median
Cases
time in
days
6
142
31
142
9
24
1
104
1
128

Outgoing Requests
(from U.S.)
% of
Median
Cases
time in
days
21
191
24
156
6
158
2
207
0
103

27
20
5
100

32
6
9
100

46
141
34
110

100
147
129
139

Joint Audits and Multinational Audits
1. Does the United States use joint audits?

The United States engages in an audit cooperation program, the
“Simultaneous Examination Program” and the “Criminal
Investigation Program” (SCIP). These programs are authorized by
the exchange of information provisions of U.S. tax treaties and the
tax information exchange agreements with other countries. The
United States uses these programs to investigate tax issues related to
55

Id.
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specific taxpayers in cases where a treaty party country has a
common interest. Under these programs taxing authority officials
coordinate audit plans and information requests.
2. How many agreements for joint audits have been concluded by

the United States? How many joint audits have been
conducted until now?
The Internal Revenue Service, currently, the United States has
working arrangements under its Simultaneous Examination Program
(SEP) with Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Korea,
Mexico, Norway, Philippines, Sweden and the United Kingdom.56
According to the Internal Revenue Manual, the absence of a working
agreement with a particular country does not prevent an examiner
from recommending simultaneous examination because the legal
basis for such examinations is the exchange of information article of
tax treaties and TIEAs.
The legitimacy of tax solutions other than exchange of information
3. As far as the use of illegally obtained data (i.e. the LGT Bank

case, the HSBC case and the UBS case) is concerned, it is not
clear and homogeneous whether a public authority could
profit of information acquired and/or received to support both
an administrative and criminal tax assessment: what is the
position of your country?
The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides
protection from “unreasonable searches and seizures” By the
government. A person’s constitutional privacy rights can only be
invaded where she has a “legitimate expectation of privacy.” The
consequence of violating the privacy right is exclusion of evidence
obtained as “fruit of a poisonous tree.” Some precedent unfavorable
to the taxpayer exists on the question of whether a taxpayer has a
legitimate expectation of privacy with respect to bank records.57
56

IRS,
Int.
Rev.
Man.
4.60.1.3,
available
at
http://www.irs.gov/irm/part4/irm_04-060-001.html#d0e440.
57
See, e.g., United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980) (holding that a U.S.
taxpayer has no such legitimate expectation of privacy for Bahamian bank records
stolen by U.S. law enforcement from the briefcase of a Bahamian bank official in
the United States, at least in the case where Bahamian law provided little privacy
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Even if such a reasonable expectation could be established, however,
this right only offers protection from government action. It therefore
does not apply when non-governmental actors, including informants
and whistleblowers, obtain the information. As a result, provided the
informant was not a government actor and was not acting at the
behest of a government actor in gathering the information, the
government would be able to use an informant’s information, even if
the informant broke the law to obtain or convey the information.
1. In case illegally obtained data are used to support an

administrative and/or criminal tax assessment, is the taxpayer
informed and/or allowed to be involved in the due course of
procedure? Does the taxpayer have the possibility to reject
the request and/or the use of data? Can the taxpayer refuse to
collaborate with the Tax Administration without jeopardizing
his position?
The U.S. Constitution offers several protections for criminal
defendants, including the right to confront witnesses and the right
against self-incrimination. Thus, a taxpayer would, in a criminal
case, have the opportunity to challenge evidence obtained from a
whistleblower (or any other evidence in the government’s case).
With a court order, the United States can compel taxpayers to
consent to foreign financial institutions’ disclosure of account
information, including in cases where the government otherwise
would be unable to obtain the records. Compelled consent to
disclosure pursuant to a court order has been held not to violate the
constitutional right against self-incrimination because such consent is
non-testimonial.58 Perhaps more importantly, compelled production
of financial account records (e.g., through a subpoena), even where
the records themselves or the act of producing them are selfprotection for those records). See also Timothy P. O’Toole, et al, Can a Prosecuter
Make Your Cough Up Your Offshore Account? TAX NOTES p. 1313, 1314 (Mar.
14, 2011) (expressing doubt whether the taxpayer-unfavorable expectation-ofprivacy analysis in Payner would apply in a case involving a foreign jurisdiction
with strong bank-secrecy law).
58
See Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201 (1988). See O’Toole, et al, supra
note __, at 1315 (questioning the continued appliciability of Doe in light of
subsequent precedent more favorable to criminal defendants)

© 2014 Joshua D. Blank & Ruth Mason

DRAFT: 8/15/14]

UNITED STATES

23

incriminating, has been held to fall under the “required records”
exception to the privilege against self-incrimination. This exception
applies in cases where the government seeks to compel production of
documents kept pursuant to a valid regulatory regime.59
2. In case your country has ever implemented a whistleblower

program in order to collect tax information and to conduct
tax assessments, is the reward to whistleblowers taxable?
The Internal Revenue Service is authorized to pay whistleblower
awards to individuals who report acts of tax noncompliance. If the
IRS uses the information provided to detect underpayment of taxes, it
may pay the whistleblower up to 30% of the additional tax, penalty,
and other amounts it collects.60 Whistleblower awards are fully
taxable as gross income, and are subject to withholding.61 In 2012,
the IRS Whistleblower Office issued administrative guidance
describing a process by which award recipients may apply for a
reduced withholding rate.62 Whistleblower Bradley Birkenfeld was
awarded USD 104 million for his assistance in building the case
against UBS.
3. In case your country has ever implemented an offshore tax

amnesty and/or an offshore voluntary disclosure program,
59

See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings, No. 4-10, (No. 12-13131, D.C.
Docket
No.
GJ
4-10)
(D.C.Cir.
2013)
available
at
http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/201213131.pdf at 4-5 (upholding
district court’s ruling that the required records exception applied because “(1)
federal law required [the taxpayers] to maintain and make available for inspection
records regarding their foreign financial accounts; (2) that recordkeeping
requirement… was ‘essentially regulatory’ and not criminal in nature; (3) the
records were of the sort that ‘bank customers would customarily keep’; and (4) the
records had ‘public aspects’ because they contained information that federal law
[the taxpayers] to maintain and make available for inspection by the IRS [and]. . .
report to the Treasury Department”.) Op. at 4-5. The last requirements, (3) and (4)
above, refer to (a) the requirement under the Bank Secrecy Act that U.S. persons
keep certain records regarding foreign accounts, including the name and value of
the account, and (b) the requirement to file an FBAR) See also id. at 14 (citing
other circuit courts reaching the same conclusions, including the Fifth, Seventh,
and Ninth Circuits).
60
I.R.C. § 7623(b).
61
I.R.C. § 61.
62
See IRSIG WO -25-0612-03.
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what is the ground of legitimacy for such initiatives? Do the
programs cover administrative as well as criminal tax
exposures?
The IRS currently allows taxpayers to participate in an Offshore
Voluntary Disclosure Program. Under the current program, which
has no deadline, individuals who disclose their offshore bank
accounts are subject to a civil tax penalty of 27.5 percent of the
highest aggregate balance in foreign bank accounts or value of
foreign assets during the eight full tax years prior to the disclosure.63
Individuals who participate in this program are not subject to criminal
tax evasion charges, which could result in prison.64 The IRS offered
similar voluntary disclosure initiatives in 200965 and 2011, albeit with
disclosure deadlines and lower civil tax penalties.66 According to the
IRS, these two initiatives resulted in 33,000 disclosures and more
than USD 3.4 billion in collected taxes.67 A requirement common to
all three programs was that, to be eligible to participate, the taxpayer
had to disclose before the IRS received the taxpayer’s name from any
other source (including John Doe summonses, UBS disclosures, etc).

63

See IRS, IRS Offshore Programs Produce $4.4 Billion To Date for Nation’s
Taxpayers; Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program Reopens, Jan. 9, 2012.
64
See id.
65
See IRS, Voluntary Disclosure: Questions and Answers,
http://www.irs.gov/uac/Voluntary-Disclosure:-Questions-and-Answers (first posted
May 6, 2009).
66
See IRS, 2011 Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Initiative Frequently Asked
Questions and Answers, http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/
International-Businesses/2011-Offshore-Voluntary-Disclosure-InitiativeFrequently-Asked-Questions-and-Answers (first posted Feb. 8, 2011).
67
See id.
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Some U.S. states offer similar voluntary disclosure programs,
which is important because the federal and state governments share
information, so any offshore information obtained by the United
States can be made available to the U.S. person’s residence state.68
4. Is your country discussing the implementation of a so called

Rubik standard agreement with Switzerland or any other
country? What would the ground of legitimacy be for such
initiative?
No, the Rubik agreements are not part of the U.S. strategy for
combating tax evasion, as the United States prefers automatic
exchange of information to anonymous withholding. In February
2013, the United States signed a Model 2 IGA with Switzerland
under which covered Swiss financial institutions will automatically
report U.S. persons’ account information directly to the IRS.
Furthermore, the United States has developed a program under which
Swiss banks that helped U.S. taxpayers evade their U.S. tax
obligations can come forward, make aggregate disclosures (e.g.,
about where U.S. taxpayers leaving the participating bank transferred
their funds), and thereby avoid prosecution. The program does not
apply to the 14 Swiss banks already subject to investigation by U.S.
prosecutors.

68

See, e.g., New Jersey Dept. of Treasury Press Release (Jun. 13, 2013)
available at http://www.state.nj.us/treasury/taxation/offshore.shtml (describing state
program that complements the federal OVDI under which participants “avoid all
civil penalties, including the 50% civil fraud penalty. However, the 5% late
payment penalty and the 5% amnesty penalty will not be waived”). Similar
programs are available in many states, including California, Connecticut, Florida,
and New York.

